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Abstract. This work analyzes the impacts of the ”Packet Too Big”-
”Packet Too Small” (PTB-PTS) Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMP)
based attack against tunneling gateways. It is a follow up of a prior work
[2] that detailed how to launch the PTB-PTS attack against IPsec gate-
ways (for secure tunnels) and their consequences, ranging from major
performance impacts (additional delays at session establishment and/or
packet fragmentation) to Denial of Services (DoS).
In the present work we examine a much wider range of configurations:
we now consider the two IP protocol versions (previous work was lim-
ited to IPv4, we add IPv6), two operating systems (previous work was
limited to Linux Debian, we add a recent Ubuntu distribution as well as
Windows 7), and two tunnelling protocols (previous work was limited to
IPsec, we add IPIP).
This work highlights the complexity of the situation as different behav-
iors will be observed depending on the exact configuration. It also high-
lights Microsoft’s strategy when approaching the ”minimum maximum
packet size” (i.e., minimum MTU) any link technology should support:
if Windows 7 mitigates the attack in IPv4 (there is no DoS), however
the performance impact remains, and since the technique is inapplicable
to IPv6, the attack succeeds in that case. Finally, this work highlights a
fundamental problem: the impossibility to reliably identify illegitimate
ICMP error packets coming from the untrusted network.
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1 Introduction
This work analyzes the impacts of the ”Packet Too Big”-”Packet Too Small”
(PTB-PTS) Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMP) based attack against tun-
neling gateways. The idea behind the attack is to take advantage of both:
– the ”minimum maximum packet size” any link technology should support
(officially called ”minimum Maximum Transmission Unit, or ”minimum MTU”),
namely 576 bytes with IPv4 and 1280 bytes with IPv6;
– the necessary addition of headers at a tunnelling gateway that increases the
packet size after encapsulation;
The attack principle is to reduce the MTU along the path at the tunneling
gateway down to the ”minimum MTU”, so that the gateway prevents any client
from sending packets of size larger than the ”minimum MTU” minus the required
size for the tunneling headers. Confusion is then created between the gateway and
the clients that are asked to use packets of size lower than the ”minimum MTU”.
This confusion creates either performance impacts (caused by IP fragmentation)
or deadlocks resulting in a Denial of Service (DoS). This is illustrated in Figure 1
that shows the local client (A) and gateway (G) that is targeted by the attacker
located in the Internet (not shown).
Fig. 1: Attack principles: dealing with an MTU lower than the minimum autho-
rized MTU.
This work is a follow up of a prior work [2] that detailed how to launch
the PTB-PTS attack against IPsec gateways (in ESP/tunneling mode) and
their consequences in case of a Linux clients. In the present work we examine a
much wider range of configurations. In addition to the transport protocol (TCP
versus UDP) and path MTU discovery mechanism (PMTUd [4] versus PLPMTUd
[3]) parameters, both already considered in previous work, we now consider:
– two IP protocol versions: previous work was limited to IPv4, we add IPv6;
– two operating systems: previous work was limited to Linux Debian, we add
a recent Ubuntu distribution as well as Windows 7, and carried out a few
tests with Windows 10 (not reported here) with similar results;
– and two tunnelling protocols: previous work was limited to IPsec, we add
IPIP.
The contributions of the present work are three-fold:
– this work first highlights the complexity of the situation, as totally dif-
ferent behaviors are observed depending on the exact configuration;
– it highlights Microsoft limited solution when fragmentation is needed. If
it mitigates the attack in IPv4 (no DoS), however the performance impact
is present and the technique remains inapplicable to IPv6 where a DoS is
observed;
– finally, it highlights a fundamental problem: the impossibility to iden-
tify illegitimate ICMP error packets coming from the untrusted network. If
approaches exist to mitigate it, there is no real solution to the core problem.
This work also differs from the previous attacks on ICMP (a known vector of
attacks) by the fact that ICMP is not the target, it is only an intermediate to
launch the attack. Additionally, a single valid (i.e., correctly formatted) ICMP
error packet is sufficient to launch the attack.
The paper is organized as follows: we quickly provide some background and
explain the attacker model; the following section is devoted to the PTB-PTS
attack, detailing the results with the new configurations; finally we wrap-up and
discuss the results. We invite the interested reader to refer to [2] for a detailed
background on ICMP, on ICMP ”Packet Too Big” error messages, on the two Path
MTU discovery mechanisms, and the way the PTB-PTS attack can be launched
in case of IPsec. In the following, we essentially focus on the new results.
2 The attacker model
In this work, we consider that all the attacks are conducted by adversaries located
on the external unsecure network, typically the Internet. With IPsec, the security
gateway can filter out any ICMP error packet not coming from the path, by
checking the copy of the packet that needs to be present in the payload of the
ICMP error packet. This is performed by decrypting this packet and checking
that it refers to an active IPsec Security Association in the local database. This
way, IPsec avoids attacks initiated by attackers that cannot intercept legitimate
packets, typically attackers that are not in the path followed by IPsec packets.
However, no such security mechanism exists with the IPIP tunneling mechanism
that we also consider in this work. In that case, any attacker capable of forging
and sending an ICMP ”Packet Too Big” (PTB) error packet can launch the attack,
which greatly simplifies the attack compared to the IPsec case.
To summarize, in case of IPsec, we assume an attacker can both eavesdrop
the traffic in the IPsec tunnel and inject a forged packet (a single packet is
sufficient). However the attacker has no way to decrypt packets nor encrypt
its own packets (the underlying IPsec cryptographic building blocks and key
exchange protocols are considered secure). For instance, the attacker can be
located on a compromised router along the path followed by an IPsec tunnel,
in the external unsecure black network. More simply, the attacker can also be
associated to the same unsecure WiFi network (e.g., that sends WiFi frames in
the clear, without any WPA/WPA2 security) as the target user that connects
to his home network through an IPsec VPN.
In case of IPIP, the attack is much simpler to launch. We assume the attacker
knows the IP address of the IPIP tunnel and can inject a forged packet (here
also, a single packet is sufficient).
3 Launching the PTB-PTS attack
3.1 Test configuration
The testbed is depicted in Figure 2. Five virtual machines are created (with
Virtual-Box). The compromised router and two gateways use Ubuntu 14.04.2
Fig. 2: Test configuration showing the compromised router (attacker), the two
tunneling gateways, and the two end-hosts.
LTS. The gateways use the Openswan IPsec implementation with its default
configuration. The two clients use either Ubuntu 14.04.2 LTS or Windows 7,
without changing any internal configuration parameter. The MTU on the various
(virtual) links is configured to the usual 1500 byte Ethernet value.
TCP connection is tested either through ssh (that implies the transmission
of keying material whose size is larger than the MTU) or FTP (that implies the
transmission of a large file). With both tools, the three-way TCP connection
handshake succeeds but problems may arise later when dealing with larger TCP
segments.
In the following sections, we detail the exchanges, the first two steps (1 and
2), common to any IPsec test, being factorized. Even if we do not detail all the
configurations, they are summarized in tables 2 and 2.
3.2 Step 1 (common): Forging an ICMP PTB packet from the
untrusted network
The attacker first has to forge an appropriate ICMP PTB packet (a single packet
is sufficient). With IPsec, this is done by eavesdropping a valid packet from the
IPsec tunnel on the untrusted network. Then the attacker forges an ICMP PTB
packet, specifying a very small MTU value equal or smaller than 576 with IPv4
(resp. 1280 with IPv6). The attacker can use 0 for instance as this is checked
by the gateway that will revert to 576 (resp. 1280). This packet spoofs the IP
address of a router of the untrusted network (in case the source IP address is
checked), and in order to bypass the IPsec protection mechanism against blind
attacks, it includes as a payload a part of the outer IP packet that has just been
eavesdropped. This is the only packet an attacker needs to send, and none of the
following steps involve the attacker any more. The process is similar (and even
simpler) in case of IPIP.
3.3 Step 2 (common): Reset of the PMTU on the gateway
This ICMP packet then arrives to the IPsec gateway. As the packet appears to
belong to an active tunnel, the gateway stores the following PMTU value in
its SAD: PMTUSAD = max(MTUICMPPTB , 576) = 576 bytes. Note that the
gateway never stores a proposed value smaller than the minimum guaranteed
MTU, 576 (resp. 1280) bytes.
At this point, the traffic is not blocked in any way between the targeted gate-
way and the remote end of the tunnel. Nevertheless the throughput is reduced on
the IPsec tunnel as any packet exceeding the PMTU_SAD size must be fragmented
(usually by the end-host).
3.4 Following steps with Linux, TCP/IPv4 and PMTUd
The following steps depend on the end-host client Operating System (OS), IP
version, and MTU discovery protocol. In case of Linux Ubuntu 14.04.2 LTS
(for all machines, end-hosts and gateways), TCP (ssh connection to the remote
end-host), IPv4, PMTUd, we observe the following: the TCP 3-way handshake
performs normally as all TCP segments are of tiny size. Then a large packet is
sent with the IPv4 Don’t Fragment (DF) bit turned one.
This packet gets rejected by the IPsec gateway as it exceeds the PMTU_SAD
value stored in the SAD, and an ICMP PTB error packet is sent back with
the following MTU indication: MTU = PMTUSAD − sizeof(IP + IPsec +
ESPheaders). Due to the encapsulation header (whose size depends on the
chosen ciphering algorithm), the gateway restricts the MTU value to 502 bytes.
Upon receiving this ICMP PTB packet, the large TCP segment is fragmented.
Nevertheless, instead of creating 502 byte long packets as requested by the gate-
way, TCP chooses to reduce the MSS to 500 bytes only as it considers the
value advertised by the ICMP PTB is below what should be accepted by any link.
More precisely, with Linux there is a minimum PMTU configuration param-
eter (e.g., cat /proc/sys/net/ipv4/route/min_pmtu returns 552 on Debian
”Squeeze”) that is preferred to the value advertised by the ICMP PTB message:
PMTU = max(MTUICMPPTB , PMTUconfig). So, once the TCP/IP headers
are added, the 500 byte long TCP segment results in a 552 byte long packet.
Since it remains too large, the packet is dropped by the gateway and this
latter replies with the same ICMP PTB packet, with the same result.
After 2 minutes of failures and a total of 10 re-transmission attempts, the ssh
server closes the connection (FIN/ACK exchange quickly followed by a RST).
The DoS successfully prevented any ssh setup.
3.5 Following steps with Linux, TCP/IPv4 and PLPMTUd
In case of TCP/IPv4 and PLPMTUd, we observe the following: the TCP 3-way
handshake performs normally. Then a large packet is sent with the IPv4 Don’t
Fragment (DF) bit turned one.
This packet gets rejected by the IPsec gateway and an ICMP PTB is returned
to the end-host that restricts the MTU to 502 bytes.
Although PLPMTUd is not dependant on ICMP, this error message is imme-
diately taken into account and TCP segments of maximum size 500 bytes are
sent. Once the TCP/IP headers are added, each 500 byte long TCP segment
results in a 552 byte long packet.
Since it remains too large, the packet is dropped by the gateway and this
latter replies with the same ICMP PTB packets, with the same result.
This pattern happens 5 times, generating a total of 6 ICMP PTB packets in-
cluding the first one.
Then, 6.3 seconds after the TCP connection establishment, the PLPMTUd
component decides to drastically reduce the segment size: instead of 500 byte
TCP segments, it now sends a sequence of alternatively 256 byte TCP segment
followed by a 244 byte TCP segment. Those segment are typically probes, chosen
by PLPMTUd in order to test this value.
Since the resulting packets are small enough (at most 256 + 52 = 308 bytes),
they reach the other side that acknowledges them. This is considered by PLPM-
TUd as the sign that this MSS size is appropriate, even though it is lower than
the minimum guaranteed MTU. Therefore the ssh connection finishes after a few
additional segments and a prompt appears in the terminal.
To conclude a delay of 6.3s was required for the ssh connection to be setup.
Additionally, any packet leaving the host after this initial delay contains at most
256 bytes of TCP payload, which significantly reduces the TCP throughput and
consumes more resources throughout the path.
3.6 Following steps with Linux, TCP/IPv6 and PMTUd
In case of TCP/IPv6 and PMTUd, we observe the following: the situation is
pretty much the same as with IPv4. The main difference is the ICMP PTB packet
that advertises a MTU of 1198 bytes (i.e., 1280 minus the various IPsec encap-
sulation headers).
Upon receiving this ICMP PTB packet, the large TCP segment is fragmented
into TCP segments of maximum size 1200 bytes. Once the TCP/IPv6 headers
are added, it results into packets of maximum size 1256 bytes, which is too large
for the IPsec gateway.
After 2 minutes of failures and a total of 10 re-transmission attempts, the ssh
server closes the connection (FIN/ACK exchange quickly followed by a RST).
The DoS successfully prevented any ssh setup.
3.7 Following steps with Linux, TCP/IPv6 and PLPMTUd
In case of TCP/IPv6 and PLPMTUd, we observe the following: the situation
is pretty much the same as with IPv4. However upon receiving the ICMP PTB
packet that advertises a MTU of 1198 bytes, the end-host first tries to use TCP
segments of size 1200 bytes , still too large for the IPsec gateway. A total of 4
re-transmissions happen, generating a total of 5 ICMP PTB packets including the
first one.
Then, 3.3 seconds after the beginning, the end-host tries with TCP segments
of size 504 bytes. Once the TCP/IPv6 headers are added, it results into packets
of maximum size 560 bytes, which is acceptable for the IPsec gateway. The ssh
connection finishes after a few additional segments and a prompt appears in the
terminal.
To conclude a delay of 3.3s was required for the ssh connection to be setup
(compared to 6.3 in case of IPv4). Additionally, any packet leaving the host
after this initial delay contains at most 504 bytes of TCP payload, far below the
1280 minimum MTU guaranteed by IPv6. This behavior significantly reduces
the TCP throughput and consumes more resources in the forwarding nodes.
3.8 Following steps with Windows 7, TCP/IPv4 and default
configuration
In case of TCP/IPv4, we observe the following: the TCP 3-way handshake per-
forms normally. Then a large packet is sent with the IPv4 Don’t Fragment (DF)
bit turned on. This packet gets rejected by the IPsec gateway which returns an
ICMP PTB with an MTU value set to 502 bytes.
Upon receiving this ICMP PTB packet, the Windows 7 end-host sends a smaller
TCP segment, of size 556 bytes (instead of 502 bytes), with the IPv4 DF bit
now turned off. Once the TCP/IP headers are added, this TCP segment results
in a 596 byte long packet.
This packet is still too large for the IPsec gateway, however the IPv4 DF bit
being turned off, IP fragmentation is now authorized. The packet therefore gets
fragmented by IP within the IPsec gateway, then reassembled on the other side
of the tunnel and acknowledged.
Upon receiving this acknowledgment, the following TCP segment is now of
size 1112 (i.e., 1152 with TCP/IPv4 headers), here also with the DF bit turned
off. This large packet therefore gets fragmented by IP within the IPsec gateway,
then reassembled on the other side of the tunnel, and acknowledged by the
remote TCP.
The process continues, with TCP segment sizes that progressively increase
(we observed a maximum value of 63,940 bytes!), always with the DF bit turned
off. All of them are IP fragmented into small IP datagrams of size 548 bytes or
120 bytes. The traffic on the IPsec tunnel is therefore composed of a many tiny
packets (never more than 548 bytes long), which creates a huge performance
penalty in case of high rate data flows.
3.9 Following steps with Windows 7, TCP/IPv6 and default
configuration
In case of TCP/IPv6, we observe the following: the TCP 3-way handshake per-
forms normally. Then a large packet is sent. This packet gets rejected by the
IPsec gateway which returns an ICMP PTB with an MTU value set to 1198 bytes
(as in Section 3.6).
Upon receiving this ICMP PTB packet, the Windows 7 end-host sends a TCP
segment of size 1212 bytes (1276 bytes with the TCP/IPv6 headers), which is
too large for the IPsec gateway. However the end-host, upon receiving the same
ICMP PTB packet, keeps on using TCP segments of size 1212 bytes, resulting in
the same problem.
After 10 transmission attempts and 21 seconds, the ftp client closes the con-
nection (with a RST). The DoS successfully prevented any ssh setup.
3.10 Summary of the results
Tables 1 and 2 summarize the consequences of a PTB-PTS attack on end-hosts
depending on the exact configuration and tunnelling protocol in use. It highlights
the large diversity of consequences for the same attack, i.e., the attacker follows
the same approach and issues the same forged ICMP PTB packet (IPv4 or IPv6)
in all IPsec (resp. IPIP) attacks.
IPsec tunnel Results of a PTB-PTS attack
TCP/IPv4, PMTUd DoS: no ssh connection setup (TCP close after 2 mn)
TCP/IPv4, PLPMTUd
Major performance impacts: initial 6.3 sec delay, then
tiny packets (TCP MSS=256)
UDP/IPv4, PMTUd Major performance impacts: tiny packets
TCP/IPv6, PMTUd DoS: no ssh connection setup (TCP close after 2 mn)
TCP/IPv6, PLPMTUd
Major performance impacts: initial 3.3 sec delay, then
small packets (TCP MSS=504)
IPIP tunnel Results of a PTB-PTS attack
TCP/IPv4, PMTUd
Major performance impacts: initial 7 min. delay, then
small packets
TCP/IPv4, PLPMTUd
Major performance impacts: initial 6.7 sec delay, then
small packets
Table 1: Results for Linux Ubuntu 14.04.02 LTS clients.
4 Discussion
This work highlights two issues:
IPsec tunnel Results of a PTB-PTS attack
TCP/IPv4
Functional, but major performance impacts (548 and 120
byte IP fragments)
TCP/IPv6 DoS: no ftp transfer possible (TCP close after 21 sec)
IPIP tunnel Results of a PTB-PTS attack
TCP/IPv4 DoS: no ssh connection setup (TCP close after 35 sec)
Table 2: Results for Windows 7 clients.
– Issue 1: dealing with a small Path MTU in presence of a tunnel:
When the Path MTU advertised to a tunneling gateway through an ICMP PTB
packet approaches the ”minimum MTU” (i.e., 576 or 1280 bytes), problems
can arise as IPsec and IPIP tunneling need to add encapsulation headers.
There are two sides to the problem:
• on the one side the IPsec gateway should not accept a request to reduce
its Path MTU if, after encapsulation, the MTU advertised to end-hosts
is below the ”minimum MTU”. This is typically a situation where an
alarm should be sent to the IPsec gateway administrator;
• on the other side, the end-host is ignorant of the need to keep room
for the encapsulation headers at the gateway and it rejects any request
to go below the ”minimum MTU”. For instance, a Linux host simply
ignores any Path MTU advertised by the gateway if it is smaller than
the minimum MTU configured locally. If the end-host uses PMTUd, the
compliance to the minimum MTU is strict and a DoS results. If the end-
host uses PLPMTUd, it will take time for TCP to find an appropriate
segment size (which remains significantly smaller than the one advertised
by the gateway). With Windows 7, the end-host decides not to set the
IPv4 DF bit any more when it encountered an error, which is of course
only valid with IPv4 (there is no IPv6 datagram fragmentation possible).
In any case, even if a DoS is avoided, there is a major performance impact
due to packet fragmentation; Note that tests (not reported here) carried
out with Windows 10 led to similar results.
– Issue 2: determining the legitimacy of untrusted ICMP PTB packets:
The security measures W.R.T. the processing of ICMP PTB packets, namely
the outer header verification and payload verification, are essential to avoid
blind attacks, but not sufficient if the attacker is on the path followed by
the IPsec tunnel (and this can be pretty easy in case a client is connected
through an open WiFi network, see [2]). And the situation is even worse
with IPIP, as there is way to filter out attacks coming from attackers that
are not on the path followed by the IPIP tunnel. No fully reliable solution
exists to distinguish legitimate from illegitimate ICMP PTB error messages,
which is a fundamental issue.
Let us now discuss several potential counter-measures.
4.1 Trivial unsatisfying counter-measures
A trivial counter measure to mitigate the attack consists in configuring the IPsec
gateway so that IPv4 packets are fragmented regardless of the original DF bit
setting. This is feasible (and recommended) with Cisco IOS 12.2(11)T and above
([1], ”DF Bit Override Functionality with IPsec Tunnels” section). However, as
mentioned in [1], ”a significant performance impact occurs at high data rate”,
and ignoring the DF bit cannot be considered as a valid approach, especially as
this is inapplicable to IPv6.
Another trivial counter measure consists in ignoring all ICMP PTB packets
coming from the unsecure network. However, this choice compromises PMTUd
that the use of PLPMTUd within end-hosts cannot totally compensate (e.g.,
PLPMTUd is only applicable to protocols like TCP relying on acknowledge-
ments, no to UDP).
4.2 Two complementary counter-measures
A more interesting choice consists in refusing to reduce the MTU below 576
(resp. 1280) after subtracting the encapsulation headers (e.g., an alarm should
be sent to the gateway administrator when this happens). Doing so, the MTU
advertised to end-host in ICMP PTB messages will always be at least equal to
the ”minimum MTU” which avoids the initial delays and DoS discussed in this
work. This is not totally satisfying though, given that the attack succeeds at
least in reducing the PMTU, sometimes significantly.
Therefore, in addition to refusing to reduce the MTU below the minimum
guaranteed MTU, a second complementary approach could be the following:
since the legitimacy of an untrusted ICMP packet cannot be determined, the
IPsec gateway should try to confirm the information with a side mechanism, a
PLPMTUd-like probing. It could work as follows. The gateway generates a prob-
ing packet of a certain size that is sent inside the IPsec or IPIP tunnel. Upon
reception, the remote gateway acknowledges this probe, otherwise a timeout oc-
curs at the gateway that sent the probe. Therefore, if the probing mechanism
does not confirm the ICMP PTB information received from the unsecure Internet,
this ICMP packet is simply ignored. For this mechanism to be effective, the at-
tacker should not be able to identify and discard selectively the probing packets
sent in the tunnel. Even if this is hard to guaranty, we can note that being able to
selectively drop some packets goes far beyond the attacker model considered in
this work (Section 2), making the attack significantly more complex. Finally, an
IPsec gateway level probing mechanism, done periodically, cannot be as reactive
as the PMTUd approach (we assume ICMP packets are not filtered out) in case of
path MTU change, for instance after a route change. Therefore we believe that
both mechanisms could safely work in parallel.
5 Conclusions
This work provides new results for the ”Packet Too Big”-”Packet Too Small”
(PTB-PTS) attack against tunneling gateways. It goes far beyond the results
presented in our previous work [2] by considering several new configurations,
and in particular by extending the client OS to Windows 7 (we also tested
Windows 10 and achieved similar results) in addition to a recent Linux Ubuntu
distribution. This work highlights the complexity of the situation, many different
behaviours being observed. It also highlights the limits of current solutions that
never solve the performance impacts of the attack, as well as the fundamental
problem of identifying illegitimate ICMP error packets. Some counter-measures
exist and need to be deployed and tested in order to assess their practical benefits
in mitigating the attack, however none of them can be considered as totally
satisfying.
References
1. Cisco: IPsec Data Plane Configuration Guide, Cisco IOS Release 15M&T. Cisco
Systems, Inc., http://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/td/docs/ios-xml/ios/sec_conn_
dplane/configuration/15-mt/sec-ipsec-data-plane-15-mt-book.pdf (2012)
2. Jacquin, L., Roca, V., Roch, J.L.: Too Big or Too Small? The PTB-PTS ICMP-
based Attack against IPsec Gateways. In: IEEE Global Communications Conference
(GLOBECOM’14). IEEE (Dec 2014), https://hal.inria.fr/hal-01052994
3. McCann, J., Deering, S., Mogul, J.: Path mtu discovery for ip version 6. IETF Re-
quest For Comments 1981, http://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc1981/ (August
1996)
4. Mogul, J., Deering, S.: Path mtu discovery. IETF Request For Comments 1191,
http://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc1191/ (November 1990)
